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xABSTRACT
Steganography is the art and science of hiding secret information in a cover medium such that
the presence of the hidden information cannot be detected. This thesis proposes a new method
of steganography by cover modification in JPEG images. Essentially, the algorithm exercises
LSB replacement using the definition for steganographic values from F5. After the nonzero
quantized DCT coefficients of a cover image undergo a pseudorandom walk, the coefficients and
the payload are split into an equal number of partitions and paired. Each coefficient partition
is permuted again by the 1/P pseudo-random number generator until an optimal embedding
efficiency for its corresponding payload is achieved. Using this method, we achieve a higher
embedding efficiency than that of LSB replacement alone. We evaluate the detectability of our
algorithm by creating a multi-classifier based on the output of multiple non-linear, soft-margin
support vector machines trained on POMM features. We show that our algorithm performs
nearly as well as the state-of-the-art nsF5 algorithm, and outperforms other state-of-the-art
algorithms under most conditions.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Suppose that Alice and Bob are two prisoners in separate cells of a prison. They are
allowed to communicate with each other indirectly through messages, but all communications
are monitored by the warden, Eve. Alice wants to plan an escape with Bob, but they must
communicate discretely because Eve will throw them both into solitary confinement if she
discovers that hidden messages are being shared between them. Knowing that these were likely
to be the conditions in prison, Alice and Bob agreed on a secret key before they were thrown into
prison. They use this key to hide their covert messages in seemingly innocuous communication
with the hopes of not arousing Eve’s suspicion.
We assume that Eve, having been warden for many years, knows the tricks that prisoners
often use to conceal their communication. Eve does not necessarily need to know the details
of the escape to foil their plans; she only needs to know that secret messages are being sent
between the two prisoners.
The prisoner’s problem [19] is often used to demonstrate the concept of steganography, or
the art of concealing the presence of a message. This should not be confused with cryptography,
which is the art of concealing the content of a message. Steganography aims to disguise the
existence of a message altogether. While a steganographic system, or stegosystem, can be
as simple as writing a message in invisible ink, modern steganography typically involves the
use of digital multimedia as the message medium. Specifically, the steganographic algorithms
discussed in this thesis are concerned with hiding binary strings, or payloads, in JPEG format
digital images.
The act of embedding a payload into an otherwise innocent, or cover, object can be broken
2down into three categories: cover selection, cover synthesis, and cover modification [9]. The
first two categories, while valid, are not considered practical by most means. Alice could choose
her cover image so that it matches her payload, but this requires that she has access to a cover
object for every possible payload she wishes to communicate. In a cover synthesis scenario,
Alice creates a cover image that perfectly matches her payload. Unfortunately, dependencies
between pixels in naturally occurring images make this method difficult to perform in practical-
use scenarios. Most modern algorithms choose the third option, cover modification, to embed a
payload by changing a cover object in such a way that a message can be extracted by someone
who knows where to look. Algorithms are designed to minimize distortion while maintaining a
respectable embedding capacity. The most common location for embedding information is in
the least significant bit plane of an image.
The motivation behind this thesis is simple. We assume that the payload we want to embed
is encrypted, so that it is composed of approximately equal proportions of the number 0 and
the number 1. The least significant bits of nonzero AC coefficients of many, but certainly not
all, JPEG images occur with an approximately equal (within 10%) distribution. The root of
the problem, then, lies in the fact that the least significant bits just happen to be in the wrong
order for our payload (with probability 1 − 1/2n, where n is our payload length). Thus, we
strategically modify the cover image to hide our payload. Depending on the efficiency of the
embedding algorithm used, we change k bits of the cover image to hide n bits of payload.
However, if we were able to find a permutation of the cover image’s elements that matched
our payload exactly, and were furthermore able to communicate how to find the “embedded"
payload, no changes to the cover image would be required. This steganography would be
considered perfectly secure. Computationally, this is a very complex problem. In this thesis, we
attempt to leverage predictable, yet still statistically sound, pseudo-random number generators
to construct such a permutation.
In chapter 1, we give definitions and lay framework for many of the terms and concepts
seen throughout the paper. In chapter 2, we review the mechanics behind some state-of-the-
art embedding algorithms. We define our proposed algorithm, psteg, and our steganalyzer in
chapter 3. In chapter 4, we compare the security and overall effectiveness of psteg against that
3of the algorithms explored in chapter 2. We conclude with chapter 5.
1.2 Definitions
We refer to the natural numbers N as the set of integers greater than zero, N = {0, 1, 2, . . . }.
Fix b ∈ Z+ as a positive integer. Let the set of base b, or b-ary, numbers be defined as the set
sb = {q ∈ N | q < b} = {0, . . . , b − 1} of natural numbers less than b. Let r ∈ R be a real
number. The base b representation of r is defined uniquely as the sequence of b-ary numbers
sr,b. We refer to an element of sr,b as a digit, and we refer to the length of sr,b as the number
of digits in the sequence sr,b. Thus, the kth digit of sr,b has the form sr,b(k). The decimal, or
base 10, representation of any b-ary sequence sr,b of length n is defined as the sum
n∑
k=1
sr,b(k) · bd−k (1.1)
where d is the number of elements in sr,b describing the integer part of r. Note that if r is an
integer, then d = n. For example, let r = 231.75. The unique sequence expressing r in base ten
is sr,10 = (2, 3, 1, 7, 5). To verify, let b = 10, n = 3, and sr,10 = (2, 3, 1, 7, 5). By 1.1, we have
n∑
k=1
sr,b(k) · bd−k =
5∑
k=1
sr,10(k) · 103−k
= 2 · 102 + 3 · 101 + 1 · 100 + 7 · 10−1 + 5 · 10−2
= 231.75
In the binary, or base 2, system, sr,10 = (2, 3, 1, 7, 5) is uniquely expressed by the sequence
sr,2 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). This can be verified by calculating the decimal representation of
sr,2.
n∑
k=1
sr,b(k) · bd−k =
10∑
k=1
sr,2(k) · 28−k
= 1 · 27 + 1 · 26 + 1 · 25 + 0 · 24 + 0 · 23 + 1 · 22
+ 1 · 21 + 1 · 20 + 1 · 2−1 + 1 · 2−2
= 231.75
4For an integer q, every element of sq,2 is referred to as a bit. An n-bit integer is an integer
that can be expressed in n or fewer bits. Equivalently, the set of n-bit integers is defined as
{q ∈ N | q < 2n} = {0, 1, . . . , 2n−1}. We can see that 231 = (11100111)2 is an 8-bit integer, but
256 is not, since 256 = 28 = (100000000)2 requires nine bits to describe it. In big-endian binary
notation, bits are ordered left-to-right by significance, with the most significant bit written first
(left-most) and the least significant bit written last (right-most). This thesis will exclusively use
big-endian notation. The most significant bit of q is the most weighted element of the sequence
sq,2 and is denoted by q(1). The least significant bit, or LSB, of q is the last element of sq,2,
q(n), and is equivalent to its parity bit. The LSB of q can be explicitly defined by
LSB(q) = q mod 2 =

0 if q is even
1 if q is odd.
(1.2)
We define an image as a function f that maps an index domain X to a value set Y. If f is
a grayscale image, then X = {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i ≤ M, 1 ≤ j ≤ N} is the domain of locations along
the image and Y is the set of possible light intensities. The Cartesian location (i, j) is defined
as a pixel, and the intensity f(i, j) is called the pixel value.
1.3 JPEG compression
Raster image formats follow the convention defined above by sampling light intensities of an
image inM×N locations and storing them in anM -by-N -by-D array, where D is dependent on
the image format. Typically, D = 1 for monochrome and grayscale images. Monochrome images
require only 1 bit per pixel to store image data. Here, Y = {0, 1}, where a pixel value of 0
represents black and 1 represents white. Grayscale images necessarily require more than 1 bit to
describe their pixel values. In an n-bit image, pixel values range across F = {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2n−1},
where 0 represents black, 2n − 1 represents white, and intermediate values represent intensities
of gray.
In 1992, the Joint Photographic Experts Group introduced the JPEG image format [20].
The JPEG image format uses the discrete cosine transform (DCT) to transform image data
from the spatial domain to the frequency domain. JPEG compression is a lossy compression,
5Table 1.1 The spatial domain data of an image (top) and its frequency domain data after
JPEG compression at 75% quality (bottom).
108 122 113 104 98 87 90 96
121 124 109 103 109 105 98 93
128 124 106 91 96 98 90 89
124 122 107 75 67 71 70 84
125 121 112 76 67 75 65 77
133 122 119 89 94 107 75 73
135 124 126 94 100 116 78 75
130 124 130 88 81 98 70 80
−28 21 7 1 −2 −1 1 0
1 −5 0 −1 1 0 −1 0
5 −2 −3 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
−4 1 1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
meaning that some of the original data is lost during compression. When decompressed back
to the spatial domain, the resultant image is an approximation of the original spatial domain
data. The closeness of this approximation, or the quality of the JPEG compression, is inversely
proportional to its file size. In this sense, a low quality JPEG yields a file small file size but
creates a mediocre representation of the original image. However, even medium quality factor
compressions produce accurate results while greatly reducing file size. This makes the JPEG
an incredibly versatile image format and is a major reason that it is one of the most popular
image formats currently available.
There are five steps that the JPEG compression algorithm goes through to transform a
spatial domain image to the frequency domain. Note that an image must be decompressed and
transformed back into the spatial domain before it can be viewed. Since the DCT is invertible,
6the steps may be performed in reverse order to decompress the image, using the inverse DCT
instead of the DCT. The compression/decompression algorithm is explained in the following
five subsections.
1.3.1 RGB to Y CrCb
The human eye contains light receptors, called cones, that help the brain to distinguish
colors. There are three types of cones, and each one is particularly sensitive to one of three colors:
red, blue, and green. The RGB additive color model capitalizes on this human characteristic
by representing color as a linear combination of red, blue and green light. Many light emitting
devices use the additive color model to display colors, as well as do many image formats. For
instance, the bitmap image format (file extension .bmp) stores color image data in anM×N×3
dimensional matrix, where each M × N plane consists of intensity data for one of the three
additive color channels.
Much of the data represented by the RGB color model is highly correlated and can be
represented more efficiently for storage and transmission purposes in other color models. The
JPEG image format uses the Y CrCb color model to achieve this. The luminance component,
Y , is defined as a linear combination of the three components from the RGB color model:
Y = 0.299R+ 0.587G+ 0.114B. (1.3)
The weight of each RGB component is scaled to match the sensitivity of the human eye to
its respective color. The chrominance components are the differences between the RGB color
component and the luminance:
U = R− Y (1.4)
V = B − Y. (1.5)
Altogether, the linear transformation from RGB to Y UV can be expressed as
7
Y
U
V
 =

0.299 0.587 0.114
0.701 −0.587 −0.114
−0.299 −0.587 0.886


R
G
B
 . (1.6)
When the chrominance components U and V are scaled to be in the range of signed 8-bit
integers, we refer to them as Cr and Cb, respectively. The transform from RGB to Y CrCb is
then defined as

Y
Cr
Cb
 =

0
128
128
+

0.299 0.587 0.114
0.5 −0.419 −0.081
−0.169 −0.331 0.5


R
G
B
 . (1.7)
Since the human eye is more sensitive to differences of luminance intensity than differences of
color intensity, the color channels may be subsampled to reduce file size, as will be explained in
more detail in the next subsection. In addition to the JPEG format, analog television broadcasts
transmit in Y CrCb due to the efficiency of the model. Old black-and-white televisions (which
are actually grayscale) display the luminance channel and discard the chrominance channels.
Similarly, grayscale JPEG images only contain image data in the luminance channel.
1.3.2 Division of pixels into blocks
After the image is transformed from RGB to Y CrCb, the signals are ultimately divided into
blocks of 8-by-8 in preparation for the Discrete Cosine Transform. Since the human eye is far
more sensitive to differences in luminance than in chrominance, the chrominance signals are
often subsampled to achieve a higher compression. For this reason, color images are able to
achieve higher compression ratios (original file size/compressed file size) than grayscale images.
The image is first divided into blocks of 16-by-16 pixels. From this block, the luminance
signal is always subdivided into four 8-by-8 blocks. The chrominance signal, however, may
be subsampled into fewer than four 8-by-8 blocks. Subsampling is achieved by averaging two
adjacent pixels. The direction of subsampling is either by row or by column.
If no subsampling occurs, then the chrominance signals are also subdivided into four 8-by-8
blocks. This is abbreviated to a 4:4:4 representation (4 blocks of luminance, 4 blocks of red
8Figure 1.1 The basis patterns of the DCT.
chrominance, and 4 blocks of blue chrominance). If the 16-by-16 block is subsampled in both
directions across both chrominance signals, the resultant division is a 4:1:1 representation. The
chrominance signals may be subsampled across one or both directions and do not necessarily
have to be subsampled in the same way directionally between the blue and red channels. In this
sense, 4:2:2, 4:2:1, and 4:1:2 representations are also possible and can be defined for multiple
directions.
1.3.3 Discrete cosine transform
The discrete cosine transform (DCT) changes spatial domain data into the frequency do-
main. Each 8-by-8 block of pixels from the spatial domain can be expressed as a linear combi-
nation of the basis patterns generated by the DCT, which are shown in Figure 1.1. Each basis
pattern is referred to as a mode.
The coefficients d(k, l) of this linear combination, called DCT coefficients, are stored in
8-by-8 blocks, where k, l ∈ {0, . . . , 7} They are calculated by the two-dimensional model
d(k, l) =
7∑
i,j=0
w(k)w(l)
4
cos
(
kpi
8
(i+
1
2
)
)
cos
(
lpi
8
(j +
1
2
)
)
B(i, j) (1.8)
9where B(i, j), i, j ∈ {0, . . . , 7} are the 8-by-8 blocks of luminance or chrominance values,
w(0) = 1/
√
2, and w(k > 0) = 1. Note that d(0, 0) is proportional to the average value
of the pixels in the spatial domain block, since
d(0, 0) =
7∑
i,j=0
w(0)w(0)
4
cos
(
0pi
8
(i+
1
2
)
)
cos
(
0pi
8
(j +
1
2
)
)
B(i, j) (1.9)
=
7∑
i,j=0
1
8
B(i, j) (1.10)
=
7∑
i=0
1
8
 7∑
j=0
1
8
B(i, j)
 (1.11)
=
7∑
i=0
1
64
 7∑
j=0
B(i, j)
 (1.12)
=
1
64
7∑
i,j=0
B(i, j). (1.13)
The coefficient d(0, 0) is called the DC coefficient, and every other coefficient is referred to as
a quantized AC coefficient. The DCT is invertible, and the two-dimensional inverse DCT is
defined by
B(i, j) =
7∑
i,j=0
w(k)w(l)
4
cos
(
kpi
8
(i+
1
2
)
)
cos
(
lpi
8
(j +
1
2
)
)
d(k, l). (1.14)
1.3.4 Quantization
Once the data has been transformed into the frequency domain, every 8-by-8 block undergoes
point-wise division by an 8-by-8 quantization matrix, and the resultant matrix is rounded to the
nearest integer. This is the lossy step of the JPEG compression algorithm where some of the
original spatial data may be lost. The JPEG format provides specification for 100 "standard"
quantization matrices of different quality factors. After compression and decompression, the
90% quality quantization matrix Q90 yields a very close approximation to the original image
data, while the 10% quality quantization matrix Q10 shows visible distortion (Figure 1.2).
However, the JPEG created with Q10 will have a significantly smaller file size than the one
created with Q90.
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Figure 1.2 A lossless format image (left) compressed to a JPEG image at 90% quality (center)
and 10% quality (right).
All quantization matrices are computed from the 50% quality quantization matrix Q50:
Qqf =

max{1, round (2 ·Q50 · (1− qf100))}, qf > 50
min{255 · 1, round
(
Q50 · 50qf
)
}, qf ≤ 50
(1.15)
where the boldface 1 denotes an 8-by-8 matrix of all ones. Custom quantization matrices can
be used in place of the standard matrices and are stored in the header of the image.
1.3.5 Encoding and compression
After quantization, the majority of the image data is concentrated toward the upper-left
corner of the blocks. The high-frequency data (bottom-right corner of an 8-by-8 block) comprises
the majority of the lost data from the lossy compression. Even at medium quality factor levels,
over half of the coefficients in the 8-by-8 block will usually become 0. JPEG compression
exploits this characteristic by reorganizing each block into a vector for Huffman encoding. Each
vector starts with the upper-left most coefficient of the block which is called the quantized
DC coefficient. Starting with this coefficient, the remaining coefficients, called quantized AC
coefficients, are read in a zig-zag pattern towards the bottom-right hand corner of the block,
as is shown in Figure 1.3. Since the vectors are usually comprised of a long string of 0’s at the
end, a special code word is inserted to denote "the rest of the block is all zeros." The remaining
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Figure 1.3 The zig-zag vector order for an 8-by-8 block of DCT coefficients during encoding.
image data is typically encoded using the Huffman tables recommended by the JPEG standard,
but custom tables may again be used and stored in the image header.
1.3.6 Decompression into spatial domain
To read a JPEG image, the data must first be transformed back into the spatial domain.
This is done by performing the inverses of the above steps in reverse order. The encoded data
is decoded using Huffman tables and restored into 8-by-8 blocks of the image. Each block is
multiplied, not divided, point-wise by the same quality factor quantization matrix that was
used during compression. Each block is run through the inverse DCT. If subsampling occurred,
the subsampled channels are restored to full size. Lastly, the image data is transformed from
the Y CrCb color model back into the RGB color model.
1.4 Steganography
Let C be the set of all cover objects x ∈ C, M(x) be the set of all messages that can be
embedded in x, K(x) be the set of all stego keys for x, and S(x) be the set of all possible stego
images. A generalized stegosystem is a pair of functions (E ,D) in which
E : C ×M(x)×K(x)→ S(x); E(x,m, k) = y, (1.16)
D : S(x)×K(x)→M(x); D(y, kˆ) = mˆ, (1.17)
12
where x ∈ C, y ∈ S(x), k, kˆ ∈ K(x), and m, mˆ ∈ M(x). Here, the embedding algorithm E
embeds a payload m into a cover object x in a manner that makes use of a stego key k. The
output of E is y, which is called the stego object. The extraction algorithm D uses the stego
key kˆ to extract the payload mˆ from y. If k = kˆ, then m = mˆ.
The maximum size of the payload m is dependent on both the number of embeddable
locations in the cover object x and the embedding algorithm used. If x is an M -by-N grayscale
image in the spatial domain, then every pixel location would be considered an embeddable
location. If the embedding algorithm embeds one bit of information into every pixel, m has a
maximum length of MN . However, if x is an M -by-N JPEG grayscale image and payload bits
are embedded into DCT coefficients, then the number of embeddable locations is most likely
fewer than MN since most algorithms avoid embedding into quantized AC coefficients of value
0. The number of quantized AC coefficients of value 0 depends on both the content of the
image and the quality factor quantization matrix used during compression. Thus, the number
of possible embedding locations of an image x in the frequency domain is highly variable. The
embedding rate expresses the relative payload size and is defined as the ratio l/n, where l is the
number of bits in the payload and n is the number of embeddable elements in the image.
We assume, in general, that the payload is compressed and encrypted in order to minimize
the distortion caused by the embedding process. Compression minimizes the size of the mes-
sage, while encryption of the payload secures the message and also gives the payload desirable
statistical properties. If the cryptosystem is secure, resultant payload bits will be uniformly
distributed and the payload will share properties with a truly randomized bitstring.
1.4.1 Steganographic security
A stegosystem is considered secure if there is no way for an attacking third party (Eve)
to distinguish cover objects from stego objects. To put this into more quantitative terms, we
must first formalize what it means for Eve to "distinguish a cover object from a stego object."
Suppose that prisoners are only allowed to communicate with 8-bit, m-by-n grayscale images.
If Eve observes what she knows to be legitimate, innocent communication over a long enough
time, she will eventually be able to model a probability distribution Pc over the space of all
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cover images C = {0, . . . , 255}m×n. Similarly, if Alice and Bob are communicating in secret, a
different distribution Ps over C can be modeled with a sufficiently large sample of their messages.
Borrowing Kerckhoff’s principle from cryptography, we assume that Eve knows Pc, Ps, and
the steganographic channel used. In other words, she knows what cover (innocent) images look
like, she knows what stego images look like, and she even knows the particular stegosystem
that Alice and Bob are using. Using some metric, Eve measures how closely related the two
distributions Pc and Ps are. If Pc and Ps are very distinct, then she should be able to easily
classify a given image as being either a cover image or a stego image. However, if Pc is “close"
to Ps, then she is more prone to making errors in classification of the image.
Often in information theory, two distributions P1 and P2 are compared by measuring the
Kullback-Leibler divergence
DKL(P1||P2) =
∑
x∈C
P1(x) log
P1(x)
P2(x)
. (1.18)
If Alice uses a stegosystem that creates stego objects with distribution Ps that is identical
to the Eve’s distribution of cover objects Pc, then by (1.18) we have DKL(Pc||Ps) = 0. Such a
stegosystem is called perfectly secure as Eve has no way to distinguish cover objects from stego
objects. While some perfectly secure stego systems exist, they typically require assumptions
that contradict practical usage scenarios [9]. A stegosystem that satisfies DKL(Pc||Ps) ≤  is
called an -secure stegosystem.
1.4.2 Measuring distortion
Generally speaking, steganographic embedding algorithms need to modify a cover object in
order to hide a payload in it. We call these modifications distortions. The less an image is
distorted, the less likely it is to be detected by a steganalyst. Typically, the distortion between
a cover object x and stego image y = E(x,m,k) is measured by a distortion function d(x,y),
where d : C×C → [0,∞). One such distortion function measures the total number of embedding
changes and can be defined as
ν(x,y) =
n∑
i=1
1− δ (x(i)− y(i)) (1.19)
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where δ is the Kronecker delta
δ (x(i)− y(i)) =

1 when x(i)− y(i) = 0
0 when x(i)− y(i) 6= 0
(1.20)
and n is the number of embeddable locations in x. For simplicity, we use a single index i that
ranges across all pixel locations.
Another useful statistic for quantifying the effectiveness of a stegosystem is the expected
embedding efficiency, e, of the embedding algorithm. This is defined as the expected number of
payload bits embedded per average embedding distortion
e =
Ex [log2|M(x)|]
Ex,m [d(x,y)]
, (1.21)
where |M(x)| is the number of bits in the payload. The efficiency of an algorithm is sometimes
dependent on the specific processes that algorithm uses and the set of cover objects it acts
upon. As such, it sometimes becomes rather difficult to compute the expected efficiency of an
algorithm. If this is the case, it is determined experimentally.
1.4.3 LSB replacement
LSB embedding is one of the simplest methods for embedding information into cover object,
and it is the most popular mechanism in use among state-of-the-art steganographic systems.
It utilizes the least significant bit of an embedding location as its means of communication. A
naive embedding algorithm that uses this method is called LSB replacement, in which the LSBs
of a cover object’s embedding locations are overwritten with the desired binary payload.
Let x ∈ C be a cover image with c embeddable locations. Let the image data be of the
format n-bit integers, such that each pixel value xi can be expressed in n bits as sxi,2 =
(sxi,2(1), . . . , sxi,2(n)) and xi =
∑n
k=1 sxi,2(k) · 2n−k. Suppose that we wish to embed a binary
message m ∈ {0, 1}l of length l into x using LSB replacement, where l < c. The LSB replace-
ment embedding algorithm creates a stego image y ∈ C that is identical to x, except it changes
the LSBs of the first l embeddable locations in y to match that of the message m. In other
words, the most significant b− 1 bits of every element of y are the same as x, but the LSB of
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Figure 1.4 An 8-bit grayscale image x and its spatial bitplanes xi.
the first l embeddable locations may differ, since the LSB of the ith embeddable location of y
is given by
LSB(yi) =

mi if 0 < i ≤ l
LSB(xi) if i > l
(1.22)
Analogously, the LSB replacement algorithm overwrites the LSBs of the first l pixels in x with
the payload m. Since the LSB bitplane is noisy to begin with (Figure 1.4), one hopes that
the introduced distortion will blend in with the rest of the plane. This, of course, requires
the underlying assumption that the LSB plane of a cover image x is randomly and uniformly
distributed. This is obviously not true for all images; a completely black image (every pixel
xi = 0) would be a poor choice of cover object for LSB replacement. However, never-compressed
natural images tend to adhere to this assumption due to random amounts of noise captured
by the imaging device. Thus we assume that the LSBs of a given cover image x are uniformly
and randomly distributed throughout the plane. Furthermore, the assumption is made that the
LSB of a pixel is independent of the other bits in the pixel.
Table 1.4.3 demonstrates an example of the LSB replacement algorithm for the first five
pixels of a particular cover image x in the spatial domain and the first five bits of a payload
m. However, LSB replacement is not limited to images in the spatial domain. In the frequency
domain, LSB replacement uses the LSBs of the non-zero quantized AC coefficients in the image.
1.4.4 Permutative straddling
Suppose that Alice uses an embedding algorithm to embed an l bit payload m into a cover
image x with n embeddable elements, and suppose that l ≈ n/4. We assume that Alice will
make changes to the image in order to embed the payload and, in doing so, will distort the
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Table 1.2 An example binary payload m embedded into a spatial-domain cover image x by
LSB replacement to produce the stego image y.
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 · · ·
mi 0 1 1 0 1 · · ·
xi (binary) 1110110 1110110 1110100 1110011 1110101 · · ·
yi (binary) 1110110 1110111 1110101 1110010 1110101 · · ·
xi (decimal) 118 118 116 115 117 · · ·
yi (decimal) 118 119 117 114 117 · · ·
stego image from the cover image. If she embeds the message into the first l pixel locations,
or embeds in raster order, then the distortion is concentrated into a particular region of the
image. However, if she spreads the payload bits evenly across the entirety of the cover image,
the distortion is spread out and may be less noticeable.
Most embedding algorithms use a pseudo-random number generator to “randomly" select
locations across the entirety of an image in which to embed information. In the prisoner’s
problem, Alice and Bob both share knowledge of a secret key k. Suppose that Alice initializes
a pseudo-random number generator with seed k to create a permutation σ. She permutes the
embeddable locations in the cover image x to create σ(x) = xˆ. Alice embeds m into xˆ to create
the stego object yˆ, and restores the permuted locations to their original order with σ−1(yˆ) = y.
Once Bob receives y, he initializes the same pseudo-random number generator that Alice used
with k to generate σ(y) = yˆ. He can then extract the message m.
Embedding algorithms tackle the problem of the payload distribution step in different ways.
However, a pseudo-random permutation of the cover elements known as permutative straddling
[21] is a computationally efficient method of uniformly distributing a payload across a cover.
While the primary goal of permutative straddling lies in distributing the payload uniformly
across a cover object, it subsequently avoids embedding sequentially into a potentially invariant
region of the cover object. Consider embedding a payload into a spatial domain cover image
without first permuting the elements of the cover. If the cover image is a picture taken outdoors,
the possibility exists that the top of the image is a clear sky. Permutative straddling prevents
heavily distorting this uniform region.
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Figure 1.5 A simulation of embedding in lexicographical order without permutative straddling.
Figure 1.6 A simulation of embedding in lexicographical order with permutative straddling.
1.5 Steganalysis
Steganalysis, as opposed to steganography, is the science of detecting the presence of hidden
content in images. Since most embedding algorithms alter images in a way that is nearly
undetectable to the human eye, steganalysts use algorithms to scan an image for statistical
anomalies that may have resulted from the embedding process. The term for such an algorithm
is a steganalyzer.
Some embedding algorithms leave rather unique fingerprints on their stego objects, such
as that of LSB replacement. Targeted steganalyzers are designed to analyze content for these
trademark statistical anomalies. In general, a targeted steganalyzer is designed to look for a
specific signatures that a specific embedding algorithm leaves behind. This requires knowledge
of both the embedding algorithm used and the distinguishing statistics it leaves. For example,
LSB replacement is highly detectable by the Chi-square attack [22]. As such, more sophisticated
algorithms avoid the rather blatant anomalies caused by LSB replacement and therefore require
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their own targeted steganalyzer based on another characteristic to be detected.
1.5.1 Pattern classifiers
Blind steganalyzers, on the other hand, attempt to detect the presence of hidden content
with a single, blanketed attack. Typically, this involves reducing a high-dimensional image
down to a lower-dimensional feature space and running statistical attacks on these features. The
attacks are carried out by pattern classifiers, which are complex machine-learning algorithms.
A binary pattern classifier used for image steganalysis will classify an input image as one of two
possible categories based on its training data. While this is intuitively applicable to classify an
image as either cover (innocent) or stego, it can also be applied to classify an image as being
embedded with one of two stego algorithms. In this thesis, we construct a blind steganalyzer,
which we refer to as a multi-classifier, using multiple binary pattern classifiers as the basis for
classification. Given k steganographic embedding algorithms, we train
(
k+1
2
)
binary classifiers
on a feature set. Each classifier judges whether the input features of a given image belong to
one of two categories drawn from our pool of k+1 total categories composed of the k embedding
algorithms plus the possible verdict that the image is a cover (innocent).
1.5.1.1 Support vector machines
We use non-linear, soft-margin Support Vector Machines [4], or SVMs, as the binary clas-
sifiers for our steganalyzer. A hyperplane is the generalization of a two-dimensional plane in
three-dimensional Euclidean space R3 to that of a higher dimension, in that it partitions a set
of elements mapped in higher-dimensional space into two disjoint sets. A hyperplane has the
form
w · x− b = 0
where x is a set of data vectors, w is the vector normal to the hyperplane, · is the dot product,
and b||w|| is the offset of the hyperplane from the origin along w. SVMs map low-dimensional
feature set data to a higher-dimensional space and construct a hyperplane that partitions the
data into two categories.
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Let D =
{
(xi, yi) | xi ∈ Rk, yi ∈ {−1, 1}
}n
i=1
be the set of all training data, where xi is a k-
dimensional training vector and yi is its classification. In our case, the values xi will be POMM
features, defined in the next section and section 3.3.1. Ideally, the training data is linearly
separable, and we want to maximize the distance between two hyperplanes that separate the
training data. This optimization problem can be summarized as minimizing ||w|| such that for
any i = 1, . . . , n, we have
yi(w · xi − b) ≥ 1 (1.23)
However, our training data are usually not perfectly linearly separable. To account for this,
slack variables ξi are used to measure the degree of classification error. Such an SVM is called
a soft margin SVM. The minimization problem then becomes
min
w,ξ,b
{
1
2
||w||2 + C
n∑
i=1
ξi
}
(1.24)
such that for any i = 1, . . . , n,
yi(w · xi − b) ≥ 1− ξi, ξi ≥ 0. (1.25)
Note that in (1.24), we use 12 ||w||2 in place of ||w|| to eliminate the square root for compu-
tational purposes. C is a parameter describing the penalty for error. In the dual form of the
optimization problem, the slack variables vanish. After introducing Lagrangian multipliers α,
the optimization problem requires maximizing αi in
n∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
n∑
i,j=1
αiαjyiyjK(xi,xj) (1.26)
such that for any i = 1, . . . , n, we have 0 ≤ αi ≤ C and
n∑
i=1
αiyi = 0.
Linear SVMs define the kernel as K(xi,xj) = xi · xj , where · represents the dot prod-
uct. However, the image data that we are training is better separated by a non-linear kernel.
Non-linear SVMs use one of many non-linear kernels to replace the dot product between two
training vectors in the linear model. For our experiments, we chose the Gaussian Radial Basis
Function defined as K(xi,xj) = exp(−γ||xi−xj ||2), γ > 0. The parameters for the penalty for
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misclassification, C, and the kernel width, γ, are experimentally tested over a range of values
to determine the optimal parameters for the SVM. We measure the accuracy of the SVM at
every pair (C, γ) using a technique called cross validation.
With k-fold cross-validation, we first split the training set into k partitions. A model is
generated from k − 1 partitions, and the accuracy of the model is tested on the remaining
partition. The same parameters are used to train on a different set of k− 1 partitions, and the
remaining partition again tests the accuracy of the model. After k iterations, every partition
has been used to test the current parameters. The accuracy over every iteration is averaged,
and the next set of parameters are tried. Once the parameters with the best accuracy are
determined, a model is generated over all of the training data to create the best-fit hyperplane
in mapped higher-dimensional space. This model is then used to predict the classification of
the testing data.
1.5.1.2 Partially-ordered Markov models
The feature data that we train the SVMs with, and ultimately test our data upon, are
partially-ordered Markov models. POMMs [6] are generalized Markov mesh models (MMMs)
[1], which are Markov random fields with local neighborhoods. While Markov random fields
have been used with success in some aspects of image analysis like denoising and restoration, the
difficulty in calculating the global joint probability distribution function precludes their use for
many applications. MMMs, however, allow for an explicit closed form of the joint probability of
random variables with minimal reasonable assumptions. Davidson and Jalan [7] have shown that
MMMs are a special case of POMMs, and we provide the necessary graph-theoretic definitions
for constructing the POMMs in the next paragraph.
The notion of partial ordering is defined in contrast to total ordering.
Definition 1.5.1. Let X be a set of elements. A binary relation R on X, R ⊆ X ×X, is said
to be a total order if and only if
1. For any a, b ∈ X, if a = b, then aRa. If a 6= b, then either aRb or bRa. (antisymmetry)
2. For any a, b, c ∈ X, if aRb and bRc, then aRc. (transitivity)
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Figure 1.7 A set of vertices V = (V1, . . . , V7), a cyclic digraph (E1, V ) pictured left, and an
acyclic digraph (E2, V ) pictured right.
If the above properties hold, we say that (X,R) is a totally ordered set.
For instance, the set of all real numbers R is considered totally ordered by the operator “less
than or equal to,” since it adheres to the above relations. However, the same cannot be said
about R2, nor Z × Z. Thus, there is not a total canonical order of the pixels of an image. To
this end, we define a partial order as follows:
Definition 1.5.2. Let X be a set of elements. A binary relation ≺ on X is said to be a partial
order if and only if
1. For any a ∈ X, a ≺ a. (reflexivity)
2. For any a, b ∈ X, if a ≺ b and b ≺ a, then a = b. (antisymmetry)
3. For any a, b, c ∈ X, if a ≺ b and b ≺ c, then a ≺ c. (transitivity)
If the above properties hold, we say that (X,≺) is a partially ordered set or poset.
A good example of a poset is the set of all subsets of a given set, with the relation being set
inclusion. Note that not every two subsets are related by inclusion. This is the main difference
between a partial order and a total order.
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Let V = (v1, v2, . . . , vk) be a set of vertices, and let E = {(i, j) | vi, vj ∈ V and (i,j) is an edge
with tail on i and head on j} be the set of directed edges between vertices in V . We define the
set (V,E) as a directed graph, or a digraph. Formally, a digraph (V,E1) is considered cyclic if
every edge {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (in, jn)} = E satisfies jk = ik+1 for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} and
jn = i1. Therefore, a digraph (V,E2) is considered acyclic when there exists no sequence of r
edges ((i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (ir, jr)) satisfying jl = il+1, l ∈ {1, . . . , r−1}, and jr = i1. Figure 1.7
illustrates two examples of a cyclic digraph and an acyclic digraph. Every edge in a cyclic
digraph points in the same direction. In this sense, it is possible to choose any vertex vi and
travel across a finite number of edges to reach vi again. Conversely, an acyclic digraph contains
no cyclic sub-digraphs. Note that a digraph need not fall into one of these two categories.
We now apply this graph-theoretic model and the notion of a partially ordered set to an
image. Let (V,E) be an acyclic digraph, where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} is a finite set. We construct
a poset corresponding to this digraph as follows:
vi ≺ vi, for i = 1, . . . , k
vi ≺ vj , if there exists a directed path from vi to vj in (V,E).
(1.27)
Conversely, given a finite poset (V,≺), a corresponding acyclic digraph can be created by defin-
ing the set of edges E as follows:
(vi, vj) ∈ E if and only if vi ≺ vj and there does not exist a third
element vz 6= vi, vj such that vi ≺ vz ≺ vj .
(1.28)
We see that the correspondence in (1.28) is many-to-one. There exist multiple acyclic
digraphs that can correspond with the same poset. However, if we start with an acyclic digraph
as in (1.27), the corresponding poset is unique. We use this to describe the spatial relations
between pixels in an image. We now give four definitions that lay the graph-theoretic foundation
for POMMs.
Definition 1.5.3. Let (V,≺) be the poset associated with the acyclic digraph of (V,E). For
any B ∈ V , the cone of B is the set B = {C ∈ V | C ≺ B,C 6= B}.
23
Definition 1.5.4. For any B ∈ V , the adjacent lower neighbors of B are those elements C ∈ V
such that (C,B) is a directed edge in a graph (V,E). Formally, adj≺B = {C | (C,B) is a
directed edge in E}.
Definition 1.5.5. An element B ∈ V is a minimal element if there is no element C ∈ V such
that C ≺ B.
Definition 1.5.6. Let L0 be the set of minimal elements in the poset. The partially ordered
Markov model (POMM) is defined as follows: Let B ∈ V where (V,E) is a finite acyclic digraph
of random variables and (V,≺) is its corresponding poset. Describe the set of random variables
not related to B by YB = {C ∈ V | B and C are not related}. Then (V,≺) is called a partially
ordered Markov model (POMM) if for any B ∈ V \L0 and any subset UB ⊂ YB, we have
P (B|cone B,UB) = P (B|adj≺B). (1.29)
We explain how POMMs are used for the purposes of steganalysis in Chapter 4.
1.6 Pseudo-random number generators
Pseudo-random number generators are deterministic algorithms that generate a long se-
quence of digits that statistically resemble a string of truly randomized digits. The digit pro-
duced by a pseudo-random number generator is determined by the state of the generator, or
the input given to the generator function. The state of the generator changes after a digit is
produced. The initial state of a generator is based on a seed value supplied by the user, and this
state is referred to the seed state. The set of all possible seed values is called the seed domain.
This is where the “pseudo-random" part of the name comes from; given a specific state, a
pseudo-random number generator will always produce the same digit. In this sense, a pseudo-
random number generator is never truly random. It is important to note that all pseudo-random
number generators are periodic. Eventually, the sequence will repeat itself. If the state of the
generator contains n bits, then the period of the pseudo-random sequence has a maximal period
of 2n bits.
There are ways to generate truly random sequences of numbers, but they are all hardware-
based. Some examples include measuring the elapsed time between emissions of particles in
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radioactive decay or thermal noise from a resistor. However, it is impractical to use these meth-
ods for modern applications that require a random string of digits. Many different algorithms
exist for computing pseudo-random sequences and they typically leverage a computationally
difficult problem, such as the factorization of large integers or the discrete logarithm problem,
to ensure the security of the generator’s state. This makes pseudo-random number generators
well-suited for cryptography since the secret state can act as a shared key between two parties.
A pseudo-random number generator is considered cryptographically secure if it satisfies the
following properties:
1. Given k digits of a pseudo-random sequence, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that
can predict the (k + 1)th digit of the sequence, and
2. Should the state of the generator become compromised, there is no polynomial-time algo-
rithm that can reproduce the string of pseudo-random digits prior to the state. In other
words, the previous states of the generator cannot be determined from the known state.
One example of a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator is the Blum-Blum-
Shub generator [3]. In the publication where they introduced this generator, they also described
the 1/P pseudo-random number generator. While the sequences generated by the 1/P generator
share characteristics with a truly random sequence, it is shown that the 1/P generator is not
cryptographically secure. Given a small string of digits from the pseudo-random sequence, it is
possible to determine the state of the generator which allows an attacker to extend the sequence
both forwards and backwards, violating both definitions of a cryptographically secure generator.
However, the predictability of the generator is a desirable characteristic for the psteg algorithm,
which we will illustrate later. We explore the 1/P generator in the next section.
1.6.1 1/P pseudo-random number generator
Fix an integer base b > 1, and let Σ = {0, 1, · · · , b−1} be the set of base-b digits. We define
Σ∞ as the set of all infinite sequences of base-b digits. Let P = {P ∈ Z|P > 1, gcd(P, b) = 1} be
the set of integers relatively prime with b such that b is a primitive root modulo P . Note that
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for any P ∈ P, b is a generator for the unique cyclic group of units Z∗P . Let the seed domain be
X = {(P, r)|P ∈ P, r ∈ Z∗P }.
We define the 1/P generator G : X → Σ∞; (P, r) 7→ G(P, r) as a function that takes the seed
(P, r) from the seed domain X and maps it to the infinite sequence of b-ary digits G(P, r) ∈ Σ∞,
where G(P, r) is the expansion of r/P base b. The pseudo-random sequence G(P, r) has period
P − 1.
For example, fix b = 10, and let P = 17 and r = 1. Then G(17, 1) is the pseudo-random
sequence of base-10 digits q = (0, 5, 8, 8, 2, 3, · · · ). This can be verified by evaluating 1/17 =
0.058823 · · · and letting q0 = 0, q1 = 5, q2 = 8, and so on.
The pseudo-random sequence G(P, r0) can started at any position in the sequence by ini-
tializing the generator with seed state (P, ri), where
ri = b
ir0 (mod P ) (1.30)
Proof. Let (P, r0) be the seed of the 1/P generatorG, and let the sequenceG(P, r0) = (q0, q1, q2 . . . )
be the sequence of base-b digits generated by G(P, r0).
r0
P
= 0.q0q1q2 · · · (1.31)
bir0
P
= q0q1q2 · · · qi−1.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.32)
= q0q1q2 · · · qi−1 + 0.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.33)
Let k = q0q1q2 · · · qi−1 ∈ N. Then
bir0
P
= k + 0.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.34)
bir0 = Pk + P · 0.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.35)
bir0 − Pk = P · 0.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.36)
bir0 (mod P ) = P · 0.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.37)
bir0 (mod P )
P
= 0.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.38)
Let ri = bir0 (mod P ). Then
ri
P
= 0.qiqi+1qi+2 · · · (1.39)
as required.
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1.6.2 Predictability of 1/P
The state of the 1/P generator can be quickly calculated given only a small number of digits
from the pseudo-random sequence [3]. This is illustrated by continued fractions. By LeVeque
[13], the continued fraction expansion of a real number x has a convergent p/q if and only ifx− pq
 < 12q2 . (1.40)
Let 0 < m < P be a natural number and let k ∈ N. By (1.31), (1.33), and (1.39), we have
bkrm
P
= qm · · · qm+k−1 + rm+k
P
(1.41)
rm
P
=
qm · · · qm+k−1
bk
+
rm+k
P
· 1
bk
(1.42)qm · · · qm+k−1
bk
− rm
P
 = rm+k
P
· 1
bk
(1.43)qm · · · qm+k−1
bk
− rm
P
 < 1
bk
, (1.44)
where the inequality stems from the fact that rm+k < P by definition. By (1.40), if 1/bk <
1/2P 2, then rm/P is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of qm · · · qm+k−1/bk.
Thus, if k ≥ logb(2P 2) digits of a pseudo-random sequence generated by the 1/P generator are
known, then both rm and P can be determined. The sequence can be expanded both forwards
and backwards from (1.30) by letting
rm+1 = brm (mod P ) (1.45)
and
rm−1 = b−1rm (mod P ), (1.46)
where b−1 is the multiplicative inverse of b modulo P .
1.7 The psteg algorithm
The idea behind the psteg algorithm is best illustrated by example. Suppose that Alice
wants to embed a payload m = 00101110 into a spatial domain, 8-bit, grayscale cover image x
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Table 1.3 The number of changes nc required to embed m into xˆ1 and xˆ2.
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 6 i = 7 i = 8 nc
mi 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
LSB(xˆ1i ) 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
LSB(xˆ2i ) 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
defined as
x = {155, 178, 83, 140, 33, 77, 122, 234}. (1.47)
Furthermore, suppose that she wants to use LSB replacement as her embedding algorithm.
Alice chooses her stego key to be k1 and uses it to generate a random permutation σ1, which
she uses to permute x.
σ1(x) = xˆ
1 = {122, 83, 234, 178, 140, 155, 77, 33} (1.48)
She replaces the LSBs of the pixels of xˆ1 with m to create yˆ1.
yˆ1 = {122,82,235, 178,141, 155, 77,32} (1.49)
During the embedding process, Alice had to change the LSB of four pixels (boldfaced above)
to embed eight bits of information. The embedding operation had an embedding rate of 1 bit-
per-pixel and an efficiency of 8/4 = 2 bits embedded per change, which matches the expected
embedding efficiency of the LSB replacement.
Suppose that Alice embeds the same payload into the same image, except that this time she
uses k2 to generate a different random permutation σ2 which she uses to permute x.
σ2(x) = xˆ
2 = {234, 140, 33, 122, 77, 155, 83, 178} (1.50)
Alice replaces LSBs of the pixels in xˆ2 with m to create yˆ2.
yˆ2 = {234, 140, 33, 122, 77, 155, 83, 178}. (1.51)
Notice that Alice made no changes to the LSBs of xˆ2 to embed the payload m. The
embedding rate is still 1 bit-per-pixel, but the embedding efficiency is 8/0 =∞. In other words,
y = σ−12 (y
2) = x is a perfectly secure stego image. It is certainly safe against histogram attacks,
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as well as first-order and second-order feature-based attacks. It is also safe against brute force
stego key searches since one byte of information doesn’t make any more “sense" than another
byte. So how many keys do we expect that needs Alice to try until she finds such a stego key?
For a given cover image x with ntotal embeddable locations, let the number of even-valued pixels
in x be denoted by neven and the number of odd-valued pixels be denoted by nodd. Let the
payload m contain ltotal ≤ ntotal bits, and let the number of even and odd bits in m be denoted
by leven and lodd, respectively. Then the number of golden permutations, given by
neven!
(neven − leven)! ·
nodd!
(nodd − lodd)! · (ntotal − ltotal)!, (1.52)
is the number of permutations of x such that the first ltotal LSBs of x match the payload m.
In the example given above, Alice’s cover image x has ntotal = 8 pixels with neven = nodd = 4,
and her payload m has length ltotal = 8 with leven = lodd = 4. By (1.52), the number of golden
permutations is
4!
(4− 4)! ·
4!
(4− 4)! · (8− 8)! = 4! · 4! · 1! = 576, (1.53)
The number of all possible permutations of an image with eight pixels is 8! = 40320. Since we
assume that the pseudo-random number generator used to generate the permutations is cryp-
tographically secure, we can assume that the generated permutations are uniformly distributed
across the stego key space K(x). Thus, the probability that a given stego key k is a golden
stego key is 576/40320 ≈ 0.014.
However, the difficulty of finding a golden stego key increases with the sizes of the payload
and cover image, as is shown in (Figure 1.8). Consider the set of 512-by-512 8-bit grayscale
cover images X = {0, . . . , 255}512×512. For any given cover image x ∈ X , there exist (5122)!
total possible permutations of the image. Assume that the parity distribution on x is equal,
so that neven = nodd = ntotal/2 = (5122)/2 = 131072. Furthermore, assume that m is an
encrypted payload with equal parity distribution (leven = lodd = ltotal/2, where ltotal is an even
number). Then by (1.52), the number of golden permutations is(
131072!
(131072− ltotal/2)!
)2
· (262144− ltotal)! (1.54)
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Figure 1.8 The logarithm of the number of golden permutations as a function of cover size n
and payload size l.
If the payload size is only eight bits as it was in the first example of this section, then the
probability that Alice chooses a golden key k is merely ≈ 1/256. However, a more realistic
payload of 2000 bits gives a probability of ≈ 1/10602. With this in mind, a brute force search
is not a feasible method for attempting to find a golden stego key in a practical-use scenario.
It should be noted that if ltotal = 0, the number of golden permutations is ntotal!, the number
of all possible permutations. If ltotal = ntotal and they both have an equal parity distribution, the
number of golden permutations is ((ntotal/2)!)2, and ((ntotal/2)!)2 < ntotal! for all n. It should
also be noted that for a given ltotal, the probability that a randomly generated permutation is
also a golden permutation approaches 1/2ltotal as ntotal goes to infinity.
As opposed to finding a golden stego key by brute force, perhaps we might be able to
construct such a key. While the golden permutations are trivial to generate, the difficulty
lies in finding a stego key that initializes a pseudo-random number generator to create the
permutation. Suppose that we know a pseudo-random sequence from a generator that creates a
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golden permutation. If the pseudo-random number generator is cryptographically secure, then
by definition, it is impossible to find (in polynomial time) the state of the generator based only
upon knowledge of the pseudo-random sequence.
Consider using the 1/P generator to create the permutation. We have established that the
entirety of the pseudo-random sequence can be generated both forwards and backwards using
only a small sample of the sequence. Furthermore, the state of the generator can be ascertained.
In our case, this is equivalent to finding a stego key that generates a golden permutation.
Recall from (1.44) that if we know k ≥ logb(2P 2) base-b digits of a 1/P generated sequence
G(P, r) = (q1, q2, . . . , qk), then we can determine both r and P . Let x ∈ X = {0, . . . , b}c be
an b-ary grayscale cover image with c pixels, and let m be a bitstring payload of size k < c.
Choose a sequence of distinct elements s = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) from x such that LSB(xi) = mi for
0 < i < k. If we find a convergent Ai/Bi of q1q2 · · · qk/bk such that G(Bi, Ai) generates s, then
(Bi, Ai) is a stego key that generates a golden permutation of x for the payload m.
While this might initially seem like a straightforward solution to the problem at hand,
several other problems exist that preclude the feasibility of this in a practical-use scenario. The
computational complexity involved in computing such convergents is high. Since the stego key is
dually dependent on both the cover object and the payload, it is impossible to pre-arrange a key
between the two parties at either end of the steganographic channel. Even if side communication
is allowed between them, the size of the stego key (P, r) will usually be exponentially larger
than that of the hidden message. At this point, it becomes trivial to encrypt and send the
stego key when the payload itself could instead be encrypted and transmitted. goo Instead of
finding a golden permutation, we propose to use the 1/P generator to improve the embedding
efficiency of the LSB replacement algorithm. The steganographer first chooses a prime stego
key P . The payload and the elements of the cover image are divided into partitions. For each
partition, we exhaustively search for a permutation generated by 1/P that best matches our
payload partition. The values of r and the base b are stored in the header of the cover image
partition, and the values that don’t match are altered so that they match the payload. The
algorithm is explained in greater detail in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 2. STEGANOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS
While steganography has been in practice since the times of Ancient Greece (the etymology
of the word "steganography" having Greek roots, literally meaning "covered writing"), modern
steganography has been around since the advent of the personal computer in the mid-1980s.
The practice of open security is generally accepted by the steganography community, in which
the details of a proposed stegosystem are published for the entire community to scrutinize.
This is in direct contrast to the practice of security through obscurity, or keeping the details
of the stegosystem secret. In 1883, Auguste Kerckhoffs created six basic principles to which
all cryptosystems should adhere. Many of his principles have been considered archaic since
advent of computers, but his second principle (now referred to simply as Kerckhoff’s principle)
is still applicable and is widely regarded as a strong guideline to consider during the design
of a cryptosystem. Paraphrased, it states that the security of a stegosystem should rely solely
in the secrecy of the key; we assume that an attacker knows the details of the stegosystem’s
innards. The Enigma machine is a classic example of a cryptosystem practicing security through
obscurity. While the system was very robust to cryptanalysis, knowledge of the machine’s inner
workings led to the deciphering of many messages encrypted with Enigma. Note that Kerckhoff’s
principle does not advocate open security. The principle simply requires that a system should
remain secure despite knowledge of the system’s workings.
Although many steganographic embedding algorithms have been proposed, very few have
been shown to be secure when embedding large payloads. A digital image stegosystem is
typically specialized toward embedding in either the spatial domain or the frequency domain,
but not both. This is due to the fact that embedding algorithms are usually designed to preserve
the statistical model of the cover image. If a stegosystem tries to preserve the statistical model
of quantized AC coefficients in the frequency domain, it doesn’t make sense to try to apply the
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stegosystem to the spatial domain. While there currently exist secure stegosystems that embed
into the spatial domain, the popularity and prevalence of the JPEG image format has directed
the focus of many modern stegosystems towards embedding in the frequency domain. We have
shown that it is possible to transform the frequency data into spatial data, but it is pointless
to embed information here if the image will be transformed back into the frequency domain
since the JPEG format loses some spatial data during the quantization step. Thus, embedding
directly into the frequency domain is the most reliable method of steganography using JPEG
images.
2.1 F5 and nsF5
In [21], Westfeld introduced the F5 algorithm. A total of three algorithms are detailed,
and each successive algorithm builds on the previous one. The first algorithm, F3, introduces
the novel concept of decrementing the absolute value of nonzero quantized AC coefficients as
opposed to strictly overwriting the LSB. It avoids embedding into zero quantized AC coefficients
as the recipient of the stego image would have no way of differentiating a naturally occurring 0
from a 0 created by the embedding operation. This preserves the symmetry of the histogram
of quantized AC coefficients reflected about the 0 coefficient, but still produces an abnormal
histogram due to shrinkage. The term shrinkage is used to describe the phenomena of an
quantized AC coefficient ±1 decreasing its absolute value to 0. In such a case, the same payload
bit is carried over to the next quantized AC coefficient. This process is repeated until the bit
is embedded without changing an quantized AC coefficient from ±1 to 0. As a result, the
resultant histogram of a stego image embedded with F3 shows that the image contains more
even coefficients than is to be expected.
The second algorithm, F4, alleviates this issue by inverting the steganographic value of
negative quantized AC coefficients. In this sense, an quantized AC value of −1 becomes a
steganographic 0. While shrinkage still occurs, it is less frequent and produces a more natural
histogram than F3. The final algorithm, F5, introduces two new concepts to F4. Permutative
straddling is used as a linear time complexity model for spreading the payload evenly across the
cover image. Matrix encoding, first proposed by Crandall [5], is integrated into the embedding
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Figure 2.1 The steganographic value of DC coefficients as defined by F4.
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Table 2.1 The truth table for the "exclusive or" (⊕) operation.
0⊕ 0 = 0
0⊕ 1 = 1
1⊕ 0 = 1
1⊕ 1 = 0
process to maximize the embedding efficiency of the algorithm. As the ratio of payload bits
per nonzero quantized AC coefficients decreases, the embedding efficiency increases. Westfeld
provides the following example to demonstrate the simplest, and least efficient, method of matrix
encoding.
Suppose that we want to embed two bits x1, x2 into three LSBs of a cover image a1, a2, a3.
Consider the following possible scenarios:
x1 = a1 ⊕ a3, x2 = a2 ⊕ a3 =⇒ change nothing (2.1)
x1 6= a1 ⊕ a3, x2 = a2 ⊕ a3 =⇒ change a1 (2.2)
x1 = a1 ⊕ a3, x2 6= a2 ⊕ a3 =⇒ change a2 (2.3)
x1 6= a1 ⊕ a3, x2 6= a2 ⊕ a3 =⇒ change a3, (2.4)
where the operation ⊕ is the exclusive-or operation defined in Table 2.1. We are able to embed
two bits of information into three pixels, but we only need to change one pixel value. In this
sense, we measure the efficiency of the F5 algorithm as the embedding rate per expected value
of pixel change. In general, to embed k bits into n = 2k − 1 elements of a cover, the embedding
efficiency is given by
e =
2k
2k − 1 · k. (2.5)
The efficiency of the algorithm strictly increases with increasing k. For a given binary payload
m and cover image x with nx elements, the maximum value of k is the smallest natural number
a ∈ N satisfying the inequality
a
2a − 1 >
log2(m)
nx
. (2.6)
In 2007, Fridrich et. al. proposed a solution to the problem of shrinkage by incorporating
wet paper codes [10] into F5, and they call the revised algorithm nsF5 (no shrinkage). Wet
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paper codes, a coding scheme similar to matrix embedding, allow the sender to choose a binary
matrix D such that the product of D and the stego object y produces the desired payload m.
In [11], it is shown that the average embedding efficiency of nsF5 is slightly better than that
of F5, and the nsF5 algorithm was found to be more secure than the F5 algorithm. In 2011,
Fridrich et. al. showed that Syndrome Trellis Codes achieve a higher embedding efficiency than
Wet Paper Codes, and they have since replaced WPC with STC in the nsF5 algorithm [8].
2.2 MB1 and MB2
In [17], Sallee introduced the model based steganography algorithm, MB1, as a probabilistic
approach to the embedding process. Like F5, MB1 avoids embedding in quantized AC coeffi-
cients of value 0, but for different reasons. For highly quantized image data, most of the high
frequency information has a coefficient value of 0. Introducing distortion into these frequencies
often creates perceptible artifacts in the image, so these positions are skipped altogether.
MB1 models a distribution over each of the 63 quantized AC DCT modes (the DC mode
is skipped) and attempts to preserve this distribution during the embedding process. For each
mode, a histogram of the quantized AC coefficients is generated. The coefficients are binned
together in the histogram by a parameter called the embedding step, and the binned histogram
is hereafter referred to as the low-precision histogram h. During the actual embedding process,
the coefficients are only allowed to be modified to other coefficient values within the same bin.
Each coefficient can be represented by its bin index and a symbol which represents its offset
within the bin. An embedding step of 2 is analogous to LSB embedding in that the bin index
describes the non-changeable bits of the coefficient and the bin offset describes the coefficient’s
parity.
Once binned, the algorithm fits the parametric density function
P (u) =
p− 1
2s
(1 + |u/s|)−p (2.7)
to the low precision histogram, where u is the value of the coefficient bin and p > 1, s > 0. The
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algorithm uses the corresponding cumulative distribution function
D(u) =

1
2(1 + |u/s|)1−p if u ≤ 0,
1− 12(1 + |u/s|)1−p if u ≥ 0.
(2.8)
to fit the parameters p and s. It is important that the pdf be modeled to the low-precision
histogram and not the actual coefficient histogram, as the extraction algorithm must be able
to fit the same distribution to extract the payload. Since the embedding operation only allows
coefficients to change their symbol within the bin, the cover image and the stego image will
have the same low-precision histogram and thus the same parameters p and s for the pdf.
Once the model is fit, the probability that a coefficient has a particular offset is calculated for
all coefficients and all possible offsets. The coefficients undergo permutative straddling to spread
the payload uniformly across the image. Lastly, the permuted coefficient offsets, the associated
probability with the offset for its bin, and the payload are passed to a non-adaptive arithmetic
entropy decoder. The output offsets from the decoder are combined with their corresponding
bin indices after the inverse permutation, and the resultant coefficients compose the stego image.
The payload is extracted by performing the same steps as the embedding process, except that a
non-adaptive arithmetic entropy encoder is used instead of a decoder. The output offsets from
the encoder contain the payload.
The MB2 algorithm is the MB1 algorithm with an added deblocking step. Prior to embed-
ding, the image is analyzed for “blockiness" in the spatial domain at each of the corresponding
64 modes from the frequency domain. After the embedding process, the stego image is ana-
lyzed to compare its blockiness to the cover image. If the difference in blockiness is too high, it
adjusts unused coefficients from the embedding process to match the cover image’s blockiness.
For deblocking to be effective, the maximum payload size should be approximately half of the
capacity of the cover image.
2.3 Steghide
Hetzl and Mutzel [12] provide a graph-theoretic approach for steganography with the Steghide
algorithm. The nonzero quantized AC coefficients of the cover image x undergo permutative
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straddling to create xˆ. The payload m of length n is then paired with the first n permuted
coefficients of xˆ. At each location i, the payload bit is compared with the LSB of the quantized
AC coefficient. If the LSB of xˆ(i) = m(i), then nothing happens. However, if the LSB does not
match, Steghide uses a graph-theoretic search algorithm to find another coefficient xˆ(j), j > i,
such that the LSB of xˆ(j) = m(i). The coefficients xˆ(i) and xˆ(j) are then interchanged. The
requirement that j > i prevents swapping a coefficient that is already representing a payload
bit. This is done for every position i ≤ n. The possibility exists that for some i, there does
not exist j > i such that xˆ(j) = m(i). In other words, it’s possible to run out of coefficients
that match the payload bit. In such a case, the remaining coefficients are overwritten via LSB
replacement to match the rest of m.
If LSB replacement is not required, then Steghide preserves the first-order characteristics
of the cover image perfectly. However, it makes no effort to preserve second order statistics
or visual continuity. Its graph-theoretic approach considers only the LSB of the coefficient
and disregards the remaining bits. The possibility exists, for example, that an quantized AC
coefficient of value 1 might be swapped with a coefficient of value 96.
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CHAPTER 3. PSTEG ALGORITHM DESIGN
3.1 Proposed design for psteg
For the purposes of this thesis, the psteg algorithm was designed to embed into the lumi-
nance channel of 8-bit grayscale JPEG images. It can easily be modified to embed into the
chrominance channels of a true-color JPEG image, and the principles behind it are not lim-
ited to the frequency domain of digital images. However, the definition of the psteg algorithm
given in this section will be expressed in terms of how the algorithm is currently designed and
implemented.
The psteg embedding algorithm embeds a compressed, encrypted binary payload m into
an 8-bit, grayscale, c-by-d pixel JPEG format image x ∈ X = {0, . . . , 255}c×d. The embed-
ding algorithm is given the cover image, the payload, and a prime stego key P ∈ N. Let n
be the embedding capacity, or the number of nonzero quantized AC coefficients, in x. Let
l be the number of bits in the payload m. The nonzero quantized AC coefficients of x un-
dergo permutative straddling by a pseudo-random number generator initialized with P to cre-
ate s ∈ D = {−127, · · · ,−1, 1, · · · , 128}n. The vector s is partitioned into k disjoint vectors
(s1, s2, . . . , sk). Each partition si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, contains bn/hc nonzero quantized AC coeffi-
cients, where h = (P − 1) + dlog2(P − 1)e+ log2(u). Here, u refers to the number of bases used,
and we will explain this in more detail shortly. The last partition sk contains the remaining
n − bn/hc coefficients. Each partition si reserves the first h − (P − 1) elements as a header,
and the remaining (P − 1) bits are used to hide the payload. We henceforth refer to the header
of the ith partition as si,α and the rest as si,β . The size of the payload, l, is appended to the
beginning of m, and m is partitioned into j vectors m1,m2, . . . ,mj . Every partition has an
equal amount of bits except for mj , which contains the remaining bits. The size of the payload
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Figure 3.1 A flow chart illustrating the partitioning of an image.
partitions depend on the sizes of both n and l, and are given by
log2(mi) =

⌈
n∗t
bn/hc
⌉
if l/n < t⌈
l
bn/hc
⌉
if l/n ≥ t
(3.1)
where t is the partition threshold value. If the threshold is set too small, then the efficiency of
the algorithm drops dramatically. The exact value of t depends on the size of the cover image
and the payload, and should be determined experimentally. The last partition mj contains the
remaining bits of the payload. Note that if l/n ≥ t, then j = k.
The u largest primitive roots b1, . . . , bu modulo P are chosen to be the the bases used for
the 1/P generator G as defined in chapter 1. It should be noted that the problem of finding
a primitive root is equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem, and there is no polynomial
time algorithm to find the primitive roots for a given prime P . However, there exist algorithms
to determine whether a given number γ is a primitive root modulo P that are faster than an
exhaustive search. Since only u < 5 primitive roots are usually required, we allow this step.
The embedding process is iterated once for every payload partition, for a total of j iterations.
Let the current iteration be the ith iteration. The 1/P sequence G(P, r) is computed for every
1 ≤ r < P across each base b ∈ {b1, . . . , bu}. Let the set of generated sequences be A ⊂ A,
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where A is the set of all possible pseudo-random base-β sequences generated by G(P,Ψ). Here,
P is the set of all prime numbers, Ψ = {Z∗P0 |P0 ∈ P}, and 〈β〉 = Z∗P0 . Each element a ∈ A
is a 1/P sequence generated by G(P, r) for some r. Let Di ⊂ X be the set of all coefficient
partitions. Define the function σ as the permutation function
σ : (Di, A)→ Di; (si,β, a) 7→ sˆi,β (3.2)
that permutes coefficient partitions si,β ∈ Di according to the 1/P sequence a ∈ A. For
every a, the LSBs of the coefficients in the a-permuted sequence sˆi,β are compared against the
payload partition mi. We assign the steganographic value of a coefficient’s LSB as in the same
way that F5 does, where even coefficients less than 0 have a steganographic value of 1, and odd
coefficients have a steganographic value of 0. On average, we expect that the LSBs of a single
permuted sequence will match the payload in half of the positions. Individually, however, some
permutations will match the payload partition better than others. The number of matching
LSBs across the set of all permuted si,β tend to follow a Gaussian distribution, as is shown in
Figure 3.5.
Once the match-maximizing permutation aΩ is found, the non-matching LSBs of si,β are
flipped by LSB replacement. Since the first step of the embedding algorithm (and consequently,
the extraction algorithm) is to remove the zero-valued quantized AC coefficients, we cannot
allow a ±1 quantized AC coefficient to change to a 0. To compensate for this, we have created
two algorithms to test in parallel: psteg1 modifies an AC coefficient of 1 to -1, and psteg2
modifies an AC coefficient of 1 to 2.
Remember that aΩ = G(P, r) for a specific b ∈ {b1, . . . , bu}. Since b is a primitive root
modulo P , we necessarily have that b < (P − 1). In chapter 1, we established that the period
of a sequence generated by 1/P is P − 1. Therefore, at least one of the b-ary digits in aΩ must
be repeated if the generator is carried out to its full period. As such, the LSB replacement
operation must be monitored to ensure that flipping a payload non-matching AC coefficient
does not flip a matching coefficient somewhere else in the sequence. In such a case, then next
highest-matching permutation is used. Once a suitable permutation is found, the values of r
and b that generate the permutation are embedded into the header si,α by LSB replacement.
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2 1 1 -1 4 1 -1 -2 -1 1 -3 -1 -1 -2 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
Coefficient partition si,β
2 -1 -2 1 -3 1 -1 4 -2 1 -1 -1 -1 4 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 14, 117 = 0.0b75a9c4d26834190b75 . . .
2 -1 1 -2 1 1 1 4 -1 -1 -1 4 1 1 -3 -2
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 12, 117 = 0.08579214b36429a70857 . . .
2 -2 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -3 -1 1 -2 -1 4 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 11, 117 = 0.07132651a39784590173 . . .
2 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 4 1 1 -2 -1 4 −2
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 10, 117 = 0.05882352941176470588 . . .
2 -1 -2 1 -3 1 -1 4 -2 1 -1 -1 -1 4 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 14, 1417 = 0.b75a9c4d26834190b75a . . .
2 -1 1 -2 1 1 1 4 -1 -1 -1 4 1 1 -3 -2
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 12, 1217 = 0.8579214b36429a708579 . . .
2 -2 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -3 -1 1 -2 -1 4 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 11, 1117 = 0.7132651a397845901732 . . .
2 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 4 1 1 -2 -1 4 −2
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Base 10, 1017 = 0.58823529411764705882 . . .
Figure 3.2 A simulation finding the optimal match of payload to coefficients in a partition.
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−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Figure 3.3 A chart describing how quantized AC coefficients can change in the psteg1 algo-
rithm.
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Figure 3.4 A chart describing how quantized AC coefficients can change in the psteg2 algo-
rithm.
This process is repeated until every payload partition has been embedded into the image.
Figure 3.2 shows a simulation of the search for a payload-coefficient match. In this case,
P = 17, and the four largest primitive roots mod P are 14, 12, 11, and 10. Our payload partition
mi = (10010011) contains 8 bits. The coefficient partition si,β has P − 1 = 16 embeddable
locations. The coefficients are ordered by the 1/P sequences for each base, and the payload
is compared to the sequence. In every sequence, we let r0 = 1. We continue to analyze each
position, for subsequent values of r at each base according to equation (1.45). If a coefficient
must be flipped in order to embed the payload, it must be checked that it does not create a
mismatch at another payload bit-coefficient location. An example of this would be the sequence
generated by 10/17 base-10 shown in figure 3.2. While only one coefficient does not match the
payload, changing the coefficient paired with the sixth payload bit will also affect the coefficient
paired with the first payload bit. This is because they are the same digit in the sequence. As a
result, this location cannot be used for embedding.
The efficiency of the algorithm is not directly compulsion. As shown in Figure 3.5, the
efficiency of embedding at every partition varies. We experimentally determined the efficiencies
of the algorithms across a pool of 5000 images. For every image, we embedded payloads at
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Figure 3.5 The first 5 of 47 partitions during psteg embedding using P = 503, four bases,
partition threshold t = 0.1, and an embedding rate of 0.1 bpnz. The image is a
512-by-512, 8-bit, grayscale JPEG compressed at quality factor 75 from the BOSS
database. It contains 24290 nonzero, quantized AC coefficients.
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Rate psteg1 psteg2
0.05 2.6944 2.6956
0.10 2.7140 2.7117
0.20 2.5946 2.5950
0.40 2.4458 2.4457
Table 3.1 The computed embedding efficiency of the psteg1 and psteg2 algorithms.
embedding rates of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.4 bits per nonzero quantized AC coefficient and measured
the efficiency of each partition. The efficiencies of all the partitions of an image were averaged
together, and the efficiencies of all images at a particular embedding rate were finally averaged
together. These values are displayed in Table 3.1
3.2 Image Database
We use the BOWS2 database created for the Break Our Watermarking System 2 contest
[2]. It consists of 10,000 512-by-512, 8-bit grayscale images of varying subject matter in PGM
format. We covered the PGM files to JPEG image format using cjpeg [15], the Independent
JPEG Group’s official binary used to compress a spatial domain format image into a JPEG.
We compressed each PGM with a quality factor of 75. We divided the image database into
two halves; one for training our SVMs, and one for testing the detectability of the embedding
algorithms.
The embedding algorithms that we tested by steganalyzer are nsF5, MB2, Steghide, psteg1,
and psteg2. For each algorithm, we embedded random, uniformly distributed, binary payloads
of size 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.4 bits per nonzero AC coefficient into both the training and testing
sets. Combined with our training and testing sets for cover images, this gives us a grand total
of 60,000 JPEG images.
3.3 Steganalyzer
We forego using first-order (i.e. histogram based) attacks on our testing set due to the fact
that all of the algorithms are designed to preserve these statistics. The steganalyzer that we have
constructed is a multi-classifier that makes decisions based on the output of multiple non-linear
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support vector machines. Since we have 5 algorithms to analyze, we trained
(
6
2
)
= 15 SVMs,
where each SVM is a binary classifier between two embedding algorithms or an embedding
algorithm and the cover set. We calculated features for each of the 60,000 images, and these
serve as the input to the SVM. The training set is used to optimize the parameters for the
non-linear kernel for each SVM, which sets the boundary for classification (hyperplane) in
higher-dimensional space based off of the lower-dimensional features. The testing set SVMs use
the optimized parameters to recreate the hyperplane, and the features of a given test image
are used to represent the image in higher-dimensional terms on either side of the hyperplane.
All images on one side of the hyperplane are classified as the same label. For a given image,
the results from every SVM are compared in a round-robin scenario to ultimately determine
whether the image is cover or stego by majority vote. Furthermore, if the image is determined
to be stego, the steganalyzer decides which algorithm embedded the payload based on majority
vote.
Many feature sets have been proposed for the purposes of steganalysis. Shi et. al. developed
a feature set based on Markov models of the DCT plane [18]. For spatial images, Pevný et.
al. form subtractive pixel adjacency matrices to analyze neighborhood dependencies using
Markov chains [16]. Farid and Lyu examine wavelet decomposition and local angular harmonic
decomposition as features for steganalysis [14]. All of these feature sets describe the natural
model of images in a different way. We use the POMM features, described in Chapter 1,
to generate conditional probabilities of quantized coefficient values based on the analysis of
their pixel neighborhood. Their use in steganalysis and the construction of their feature set is
described in the next section.
3.3.1 POMM features for steganalysis
The POMM feature set models the conditional probability of adjacent DCT coefficient values
given the differences between it. The difference function f : Y → R for y1, y2 ∈ Y
f(y1, y2) = y1 − y2 (3.3)
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has been shown to be a effective for use in steganalysis when y1 and y2 are adjacent pixels or
DCT coefficients [18][16], and it plays a central role in calculating POMM features.
Let A = {Ai,j | 1 ≤ i ≤M, 1 ≤ j ≤ N} be anM -by-N matrix of random variables describing
the quantized DCT coefficients of an image. We define the subsets Y h, Y v, Y d, and Y m from
the directional subsets Y hi,j = {Ai,j , Ai,j+1}, Y vi,j = {Ai,j , Ai+1,j}, Y di,j = {Ai,j , Ai+1,j+1}, and
Y mi,j = {Ai+1,j , Ai,j+1}. We create four acyclic digraphs (V ∗, E∗) from these sets, where (V ∗ =
Y ∗ ∪ f(Y ∗)), E∗ = {E∗i | E∗i = (f(Y ∗), Y ∗)}, and ∗ ∈ {h, v, d,m} denotes the directionality of
(V ∗, E∗). For each directional digraph, we define a directional POMM P ∗ by its conditional
probability
P ∗(Y ∗ | f(Y ∗)) = P
∗(Y ∗, f(Y ∗))
P ∗(f(Y ∗))
, (3.4)
where the conditional probability is calculated by histogram binning of the image data. Since
the quantized DCT coefficients range over {−127, . . . , 128}, the computational complexity of
calculating every possible coefficient would be quite large. With this in mind, we clip the values
of |Ai,j | > C for a variable parameter C:
Ai,j =

Ai,j if |Ai,j | ≤ C
0 if |Ai,j | > C
(3.5)
Clipping values outside of C limits the number of possible P ∗(Y ∗|f(Y ∗)) to 2(C+1)2 for a given
direction *. The concentration of coefficients around 0 is high enough that offset reduction
in POMM classification rates caused by clipping is negligible, and larger values of C do not
necessarily yield better rates. We represent the conditional probabilities in a (2C+1)×(2C+1)
matrix F ∗ by
F ∗(w, z) = P ∗(Y ∗ | f(Y ∗)) = P ∗ (w, z | f(w, z)) . (3.6)
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The POMM feature set F is defined by
F (w, z) =
1
4
∑
∗∈{h,v,d,m}
F ∗(w, z) (3.7)
=
1
4
∑
∗∈{h,v,d,m}
P ∗(Y ∗ | f(Y ∗)) (3.8)
=
1
4
∑
∗∈{h,v,d,m}
P ∗(w, z | f(w, z)). (3.9)
The full POMM features set (Fintra, Finter) contains 2 · (2C + 1)2 features and is generated
by calculating feature sets of intrablock and interblock dependencies, which we define in the
next subsections.
3.3.1.1 Intrablock Features
Intrablock dependencies are the most intuitive dependencies to map. There is a natural
consistency or continuity of DCT coefficients that can be disturbed by embedding, and this
feature set serves as a method to quantify such consistencies. The feature set is generated
by computing (3.9) globally across all of the quantized DCT coefficients. Since there is no
dependent relationship between adjacent coefficients across block boundaries (i.e., coefficients
A3,8 and A3,9 are independent), we omit these edges. The calculated feature set contains
(2C + 1)2 features.
3.3.1.2 Interblock Features
From Chapter 1, each mode of the DCT basis describes a particular frequency of basis
pattern. Interblock features describe the continuity of the frequencies across blocks of the
image. For each mode (i, j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 8, we create the mode array Xi,j by collecting the
coefficient at mode (i, j) from every 8-by-8 block across the image. Formally, Xi,ju,v is the
quantized DCT coefficient located at position (i, j) in the (u, v)-block of A, where 1 ≤ u ≤
dM/8e, 1 ≤ v ≤ dN/8e. The conditional probabilities from (3.9) are calculated for all 64 mode
arrays and averaged, creating a (2C + 1)2 feature set.
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3.3.1.3 Calibration
Calibration [11] is a technique that strengthens the feature set by reducing the dependency
of the features on the image content itself. After an image is embedded with a payload, it is
transformed into the spatial domain, cropped by four pixels along every edge, and recompressed
back into a JPEG image. Features are calculated for both the original image F 0 and the cropped
image F crop. The difference between these two feature sets F 0 − F crop = F cal is the calibrated
feature set.
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
4.1 Experiment design
In this section, we outline the steps taken to prepare and execute our experiment. Ultimately,
the purpose of the experiment is to measure the detectability of our proposed algorithms and
compare this to the detectability of other previously established algorithms. To accomplish this,
we construct a multi-classifier that analyzes the output of multiple binary pattern classifiers,
in our case support vector machines. Aside from the most basic classification of an image
being either cover or stego, the multi-classifier also returns the most probable steganographic
algorithm used if the image is not cover. The steganographic algorithms used in our experiment
are MB2, nsF5, Steghide, and the two algorithms proposed in this thesis, psteg1 and psteg2.
4.1.1 Data generation
As stated in Chapter 3, we started with the BOWS2 image database consisting of 10000
portable graymap (.pgm) files. All of the images in the database are 512-by-512 pixel, 8-bit
grayscale images of varying subject matter. Immediately, we split the image database in two
equal partitions. The first half was used for training the binary pattern classifiers, and the
second half was used exclusively for testing. While both data sets were eventually be run
through the multi-classifier and analyzed, the results from the testing subset were not biased
by the training of the binary pattern classifiers.
Both of the subsets, each containing 5000 images, were duplicated six times, once for every
possible class of image (cover, MB2, nsF5, Steghide, psteg1, and psteg2). The subsets assigned
to the cover class were left unaltered. The other subsets were embedded with their respective
embedding algorithm at four embedding rates: 0.05 bpnz, 0.10 bpnz, 0.20 bpnz, and 0.40 bpnz.
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Training Subset
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(1250)
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0.05 bpnz
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nsF5
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MB2
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0.10 bpnz
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0.10 bpnz
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0.10 bpnz
(1250)
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(1250)
psteg1
0.20 bpnz
(1250)
nsF5
0.20 bpnz
(1250)
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(1250)
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0.40 bpnz
(1250)
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(1250)
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Figure 4.1 The creation of the training and testing data from the BOWS2 database.
Once all of the stego images were generated, the 98 POMM features for all 60000 images were
calculated. The training feature set was then passed to the pattern classifiers for training, and
both subsets were tested.
4.1.2 Pattern classifier design
For our pattern classifiers, we chose to use support vector machines operating as binary,
non-linear (RBF kernel) classifiers. We constructed fifteen SVMs, one for each possible pair of
classifications.
Table 4.1 The fifteen binary pattern classifiers.
cover vs. MB2 cover vs. psteg2 MB2 vs. psteg1 nsF5 vs. psteg1 psteg1 vs. psteg2
cover vs. nsF5 cover vs. Steghide MB2 vs. psteg2 nsF5 vs. psteg2 psteg1 vs. psteg2
cover vs. psteg1 MB2 vs. nsF5 MB2 vs. Steghide nsF5 vs. Steghide psteg2 vs. Steghide
Each SVM was given 10000 feature sets to train on, 5000 for each algorithm. We performed
a grid search to find the optimum parameters for the RBF kernel over the range (C, γ) ∈
{(2i, 2j)| − 5 < i < 15,−15 < j < 3}. The overall accuracy of each parameter combination was
evaluated with five-fold cross-validation. Once the most successful parameters were selected for
the SVM, it was trained on its feature sets.
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(5000 images)
Algorithm 2
(5000 images)
0.40 bpnz
(1250)
0.20 bpnz
(1250)
0.10 bpnz
(1250)
0.05 bpnz
(1250)
0.40 bpnz
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0.20 bpnz
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(1250)
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Feature
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Algorithm 1
(5000 features)
Algorithm 2
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Untrained
Binary SVM
Trained
Binary SVM
(Alg1 vs. Alg2)
Figure 4.2 The process of training a binary SVM.
We use the correct classification rates from each binary SVM to ensure the reliability of
the multi-classifier, as well as to explain the detectability of each algorithm. Another common
measure of detectability is the examination of the total probability of error PE in the cover vs.
algorithm SVM calculated by
PE =
1
2
(PFA + PMD),
where PFA is the probability of false alarm and PMD is the probability of missed detection. A
false alarm occurs when a cover image is incorrectly classified as a stego image, and a missed
detection occurs when a stego image is incorrectly classified as a cover image.
4.1.3 Multi-classifier design
The multi-classifier aggregates the output data from the SVMs to produce a single clas-
sification. In our experiment, once all of the SVMs were trained, we ran all 60000 images
(both training and testing subsets) through each SVM. The multi-classifier then aggregated
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Table 4.2 Example output of the 15 SVMs and the multi-classifier’s classification for exam-
ple1.jpg. (c = cover, m = MB2, n = nsF5, 1 = psteg1, 2 = psteg2, s = Steghide)
c|m c|n c|1 c|2 c|s m|n m|1 m|2 m|s n|1 n|2 n|s 1|2 1|s 2|s
m n 1 c s m m m m 1 n n 1 s s
c m n 1 2 s Prediction
Total votes: 1 5 3 3 0 3 m
Table 4.3 Example output of the 15 SVMs and the multi-classifier’s classification for exam-
ple2.jpg. (c = cover, m = MB2, n = nsF5, 1 = psteg1, 2 = psteg2, s = Steghide)
c|m c|n c|1 c|2 c|s m|n m|1 m|2 m|s n|1 n|2 n|s 1|2 1|s 2|s Class
m c 1 c c n 1 m s n n n 1 1 s n
c m n 1 2 s Prediction
Total votes: 3 2 4 4 0 2 n
the predictions and a classification was given for each image. Classification was determined
by majority vote. In the case of a two-way tie, the prediction from the binary SVM between
the two winners was used as the prediction. In the case of more than a two way tie, each
of the binary SVMs between the winners were checked. If a majority prediction existed, this
became the multi-classifier’s prediction. However, if a clear majority was still not present, the
multi-classifier returned that a prediction could not be made. This extreme case happened to
a small amount of our data (33 images, roughly 0.05% of all analyzed images).
For example, suppose that we wished to classify two images with our multi-classifier. The
features of the images would be extracted and sent through each trained SVM. Suppose that
the output from the SVMs for example1.jpg was such that it mirrored that displayed in table
4.2. Since, in this example, the class m would be a clear majority winner with 5 votes, the
multi-classifier would predict that the image contains a stego payload embedded with MB2.
Now suppose that the output of the multi-classifier for example2.jpg was as shown in table 4.3.
There would be a two way tie between classes 1 and n since each has 4 votes. However, we see
that the nsF5 vs. psteg1 SVM voted that the image was embedded with nsF5, and thus the
multi-classifier would return a classification of nsF5.
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4.2 Results
We trained the SVMs using the 5000 feature sets of the training subset. We then ran both
the training subset and the testing subset of images through the multi-classifier. Since the
pattern classifiers had already "seen" the training subset, we expected that the accuracy of
the multi-classifier should be slightly higher on the training subset than the testing subset. In
this sense, the training subset served as a control group for the multi-classifier. The results
from the testing subset should be consistent with any image set previously "unseen" by the
SVMs. We present classification results for both the training data and testing data, and we
make comparisons between the two.
4.2.1 Training data
We first look at the performance of the individual binary SVMs used in construction of
the multi-classifier, summarized in table 4.4 and figure 4.3. Some interesting points worth
mentioning include the following:
• The SVMs detected images embeded with the psteg2 algorithm particularly well, with
correct classification rates above 99.8% for all embedding rates greater than 0.05 bpnz
from all SVMs involving psteg2. Both Steghide and MB2 images were correctly classified
above 95% at rates greater than 0.05 across all their respective SVMs.
• The nsF5 vs. psteg1 SVM performed well on images embedded with nsF5, but poorly
on images embedded with psteg1. We have highlighted these statistics in table 4.4 for
convenience. This is probably attributable to the fact that both psteg algorithms use
the same mechanic as nsF5 to alter AC coefficients (decrement the absolute value of the
coefficient by one). Similarly, the nsF5 vs. psteg2 performed well on images embedded
with psteg2, but poorly on images embedded with nsF5.
• Cover images were classified correctly over 95% of the time against MB2, psteg2, and
Steghide. Against nsF5 and psteg1, the correct classification rate dropped to above 86%
and 89%, respectively.
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The probability of error is summarized in table 4.5. By this measure, the nsF5 algorithm
is clearly the least detectable algorithm that we analyzed. MB2 and Steghide exhibited similar
performance, with MB2 having a slight edge over Steghide. At all embedding rates except for
0.05 bpnz, psteg1 performed better than all other algorithms except for nsF5. However, both
psteg1 and psteg2 performed rather poorly at 0.05 bpnz. The error rate for psteg1 remained
nearly constant, with its only error coming from false positives. The detection of psteg2 is
virtually absolute at any embedding rate higher than 0.05 bpnz.
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Table 4.4 Correct classification rates for the binary SVMs against training data. Each column
shows the rates against a particular SVM. For example, the highlighted cells show
the correct classification rates for nsF5 and psteg1 images analyzed by the nsF5 vs.
psteg1 SVM.
Actual class cover MB2 nsF5 psteg1 psteg2 Steghide
cover - 95.08% 86.52% 89.54% 99.94% 97.82%
MB2, 0.05 bpnz 72.16% - 78.48% 99.60% 92.00% 61.52%
MB2, 0.10 bpnz 96.96% - 97.36% 99.68% 96.08% 97.12%
MB2, 0.20 bpnz 99.84% - 99.92% 99.84% 99.52% 100.00%
MB2, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% - 100.00% 100.00% 99.84% 100.00%
nsF5, 0.05 bpnz 74.72% 99.76% - 97.92% 24.56% 90.40%
nsF5, 0.10 bpnz 86.08% 99.92% - 93.68% 49.04% 92.48%
nsF5, 0.20 bpnz 99.04% 99.76% - 98.64% 92.40% 96.56%
nsF5, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% 99.92% - 100.00% 100.00% 99.68%
psteg1, 0.05 bpnz 99.76% 96.24% 36.80% - 91.28% 72.72%
psteg1, 0.10 bpnz 100.00% 97.20% 65.68% - 95.36% 87.52%
psteg1, 0.20 bpnz 100.00% 99.28% 94.80% - 96.80% 97.84%
psteg1, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% 100.00% 99.60% - 99.68% 99.44%
psteg2, 0.05 bpnz 87.76% 98.96% 97.52% 98.00% - 99.28%
psteg2, 0.10 bpnz 99.84% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% - 100.00%
psteg2, 0.20 bpnz 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% - 100.00%
psteg2, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% - 100.00%
Steghide, 0.05 bpnz 76.72% 87.60% 85.36% 88.16% 98.96% -
Steghide, 0.10 bpnz 96.64% 95.44% 97.60% 98.96% 96.72% -
Steghide, 0.20 bpnz 100.00% 98.24% 99.84% 100.00% 98.32% -
Steghide, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% 99.76% 100.00% 100.00% 99.44% -
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Figure 4.3 Correct classification rates for the binary SVMs against training data.
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Table 4.5 Probability of classification error PE = 12(PFA+PMD) for each algorithm measured
on training data.
Embedding rate MB2 nsF5 psteg1 psteg2 Steghide
0.05 bpnz 16.38% 19.38% 5.35% 6.15% 12.73%
0.10 bpnz 3.98% 13.70% 5.23% 0.11% 2.77%
0.20 bpnz 2.54% 7.22% 5.23% 0.03% 1.09%
0.40 bpnz 2.46% 6.74% 5.23% 0.03% 1.09%
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.40
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Figure 4.4 Probability of classification error PE = 12(PFA+PMD) for each algorithm measured
on training data.
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Lastly, we look at the performance of the multi-classifier, summarized in table 4.6 and
figure 4.5. Some interesting points worth mentioning include the following:
• The multi-classifier had a difficult time correctly classifying cover images, with less than
75% of all cover images being correctly classified. We see that 82% of the incorrectly
classified cover images were classified as either nsF5 or psteg1. At some level, this indicates
that the psteg1 and nsF5 algorithms preserve the cover POMM features better than the
other steganographic algorithms.
• The psteg2 algorithm clearly performed the worst amongst all of the steganographic al-
gorithms. At 0.05 bpnz, it had the highest rate of detection amongst all algorithms. At
all other rates, the detection rate was higher than 99.75%, with a perfect detection rating
at 0.20 bpnz and 0.40 bpnz (this was the only algorithm to be detected 100% of the time
at any embedding rate).
• MB2 performed significantly better than Steghide at 0.05 bpnz, but Steghide performed
slightly better than MB2 at 0.20 bpnz. Both performed significantly worse than nsF5 and
psteg1 at all levels except 0.40 bpnz.
• The nsF5 algorithm performed better than psteg1 at every level except 0.40 bpnz, but it
should be noted that both algorithms were above 99% correctly classified at this level.
From this data, the psteg1 algorithm appears to be more detectable than nsF5, but less de-
tectable than all other algorithms tested. However, all of this data is considered to be biased
since the binary SVMs had already "seen" these images before. As mentioned before, this data
serves as a baseline with which to compare our results with previously "unseen" testing data.
We expect similar results from the testing data with a slight decrease in accuracy.
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Table 4.6 Multi-classifier correct classification rates for training data.
Actual Class Class predicted by multi-classifier
cover MB2 nsF5 psteg1 psteg2 Steghide
cover 74.69% 3.00% 11.73% 9.27% 0.02% 1.28%
MB2, 0.05 bpnz 25.54% 51.16% 9.24% 9.40% 0.24% 4.42%
MB2, 0.10 bpnz 2.08% 90.80% 1.68% 2.00% 0.24% 3.20%
MB2, 0.20 bpnz 0.00% 99.12% 0.16% 0.08% 0.16% 0.48%
MB2, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 99.84% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.16%
nsF5, 0.05 bpnz 65.44% 3.77% 22.45% 7.14% 0.00% 1.20%
nsF5, 0.10 bpnz 43.15% 4.24% 45.96% 4.88% 0.08% 1.68%
nsF5, 0.20 bpnz 6.89% 2.80% 88.87% 0.32% 0.00% 1.12%
nsF5, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 0.32% 99.60% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00%
psteg1, 0.05 bpnz 54.41% 4.49% 5.85% 34.21% 0.00% 1.04%
psteg1, 0.10 bpnz 29.28% 3.04% 3.60% 62.48% 0.00% 1.60%
psteg1, 0.20 bpnz 4.24% 2.80% 0.64% 91.91% 0.00% 0.40%
psteg1, 0.40 bpnz 0.08% 0.24% 0.24% 99.44% 0.00% 0.00%
psteg2, 0.05 bpnz 0.48% 0.64% 0.72% 0.00% 86.80% 11.36%
psteg2, 0.10 bpnz 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 99.84% 0.16%
psteg2, 0.20 bpnz 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
psteg2, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Steghide, 0.05 bpnz 13.93% 4.24% 5.44% 3.28% 0.96% 72.14%
Steghide, 0.10 bpnz 1.76% 3.04% 1.36% 0.64% 3.12% 90.08%
Steghide, 0.20 bpnz 0.00% 1.68% 0.16% 0.00% 1.68% 96.48%
Steghide, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 0.24% 0.00% 0.00% 0.56% 99.20%
60
cover mb2 nsF5 psteg1 psteg2 steghide0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 c
or
re
ct
 c
la
ss
ific
at
io
n
 
 
cover
0.05 bpnz
0.10 bpnz
0.20 bpnz
0.40 bpnz
Figure 4.5 Correct classification rates for the multi-classifier against training data.
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4.2.2 Testing data
Again, we first look at the performance of the individual binary SVMs used in construction
of the multi-classifier, summarized in table 4.7 and figure 4.6.
• The detection rate for SVMs involving psteg2 remains high, with correct classification
rates above 99.3% for all embedding rates greater than 0.05 bpnz from all SVMs involving
psteg2.
• Steghide and MB2 images were correctly classified above 91% at the same rates across
all their respective SVMs. Images embedded with these algorithms at 0.10 bpnz enjoyed
a decreased detection rate of less than 5% from training set, while the 0.20 and 0.40
detection rates remained fairly consistent with the training data.
• As was the case with the training data, the nsF5 vs. psteg1 SVM performed well on
images embedded with nsF5 yet poorly on images embedded with psteg1. The correct
classification rate for psteg1 images in this SVM dropped 11% from the training data.
Similarly, the nsF5 vs. psteg2 SVM performed well on images embedded with psteg2
yet poorly on images embedded with nsF5. However, correct classification rate for nsF5
images improved by 9%.
• Cover images were classified correctly over 99% against psteg2, which is consistent with
the testing data. The correct classification rate fell by about 1% for MB2 and Steghide,
nearly 6% against nsF5, and actually increased by 2% for psteg1.
Looking at the probability of error, nsF5 is still the clear winner at all embedding rates.
MB2 retains its slight edge over Steghide at all rates except for 0.05, where it nearly tied the
error rate of nsF5. Both of these algorithms performed slightly better (< 1%) than psteg1 at
0.10 bpnz, which is the only difference in ranking from the training set at any embedding rate.
The missed detection rate remains especially low for psteg1, maintaining its consistent error
rate across all embedding rates. The psteg2 algorithm remains unmistakable at any embedding
rate above 0.05 bpnz.
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Table 4.7 Correct classification rates for the binary SVMs against testing data.
Actual class cover MB2 nsF5 psteg1 psteg2 Steghide
cover - 94.12% 79.70% 91.66% 99.44% 95.86%
MB2, 0.05 bpnz 65.76% - 78.00% 98.56% 85.60% 62.56%
MB2, 0.10 bpnz 95.84% - 96.32% 98.80% 92.88% 96.48%
MB2, 0.20 bpnz 99.84% - 99.84% 99.04% 98.64% 99.76%
MB2, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% - 99.92% 99.92% 99.92% 100.00%
nsF5, 0.05 bpnz 80.00% 99.44% - 93.84% 33.76% 90.24%
nsF5, 0.10 bpnz 90.40% 99.28% - 93.68% 56.24% 92.88%
nsF5, 0.20 bpnz 98.00% 99.60% - 97.60% 93.76% 97.12%
nsF5, 0.40 bpnz 99.92% 99.44% - 99.20% 100.00% 99.60%
psteg1, 0.05 bpnz 99.20% 88.00% 25.12% - 81.60% 56.08%
psteg1, 0.10 bpnz 99.20% 91.28% 55.12% - 85.52% 76.32%
psteg1, 0.20 bpnz 99.68% 97.04% 92.56% - 95.28% 95.60%
psteg1, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% 99.84% 99.52% - 99.12% 99.36%
psteg2, 0.05 bpnz 81.20% 97.20% 94.08% 95.60% - 98.56%
psteg2, 0.10 bpnz 99.36% 100.00% 99.68% 99.92% - 100.00%
psteg2, 0.20 bpnz 99.92% 100.00% 99.84% 100.00% - 100.00%
psteg2, 0.40 bpnz 99.60% 100.00% 99.68% 100.00% - 99.92%
Steghide, 0.05 bpnz 71.44% 84.24% 73.68% 85.12% 95.92% -
Steghide, 0.10 bpnz 94.40% 91.36% 92.96% 95.84% 96.32% -
Steghide, 0.20 bpnz 99.92% 96.88% 99.68% 99.76% 96.56% -
Steghide, 0.40 bpnz 100.00% 99.20% 99.92% 99.68% 98.48% -
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Figure 4.6 Correct classification rates for the binary SVMs against testing data.
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Table 4.8 Probability of classification error PE = 12(PFA +PMD) for each cover vs. algorithm
SVM measured on testing data.
Embedding rate MB2 nsF5 psteg1 psteg2 Steghide
0.05 bpnz 20.06% 20.15% 4.57% 9.68% 16.35%
0.10 bpnz 5.02% 14.95% 4.57% 0.6% 4.87%
0.20 bpnz 3.02% 11.15% 4.33% 0.32% 2.11%
0.40 bpnz 2.94% 10.19% 4.17% 0.48% 2.07%
0.05 0.10 0.20 0.400
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Figure 4.7 Probability of classification error PE = 12(PFA+PMD) for each algorithm measured
on testing data.
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Lastly, we look at the performance of the multi-classifier, summarized in table 4.9 and
figure 4.8. Some interesting points worth mentioning include the following:
• The classification rate for cover images dropped from 75% to 69%, but the proportion of
misclassification to nsF5 and psteg1 remained at nearly 82%.
• The detection rate for SVMs involving psteg2 remains high, with correct classification
rates above 99.2% for all embedding rates greater than 0.05 bpnz.
• MB2 still performed significantly better than Steghide at 0.05 bpnz, but Steghide per-
formed slightly better than MB2 at the other embedding rates. Both still performed
significantly worse than nsF5 and psteg1 at all levels except 0.40 bpnz.
• The psteg1 algorithm performed better than nsF5 at every level. This is the complete
opposite of our results from the training data set.
While psteg1 had lower correct classification rates than psteg1, it also had a lower cover classifi-
cation rates than nsF5. This means that the multi-classifier was still correctly classifying more
psteg1 images as stego images, but it was confusing which algorithm it was embedded with.
It is fairly obvious at this point that the psteg2 algorithm is easily detectable by all of the
tests that we used. We speculate the reason for its poor performance is that the distribution
of the coefficient pairs {1, 2} and {−1,−2} are similar. This undoubtedly makes the algorithm
more susceptible to a Chi square attack, and probably explains why its POMM features are so
distinct.
66
Table 4.9 Multi-classifier classification rates for testing data.
Actual Class Class predicted by multi-classifier
cover MB2 nsF5 psteg1 psteg2 Steghide
cover 69.30% 3.06% 18.08% 6.95% 0.08% 2.52%
MB2, 0.05 bpnz 21.55% 47.60% 15.44% 7.05% 0.40% 7.85%
MB2, 0.10 bpnz 2.08% 86.39% 2.48% 2.64% 0.80% 5.60%
MB2, 0.20 bpnz 0.16% 97.68% 0.00% 0.08% 0.88% 1.20%
MB2, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 99.84% 0.00% 0.08% 0.08% 0.00%
nsF5, 0.05 bpnz 59.09% 3.44% 29.78% 4.72% 0.08% 2.88%
nsF5, 0.10 bpnz 37.92% 4.40% 51.36% 2.96% 0.08% 3.28%
nsF5, 0.20 bpnz 5.28% 2.08% 89.60% 1.12% 0.00% 1.92%
nsF5, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 0.24% 98.80% 0.08% 0.40% 0.48%
psteg1, 0.05 bpnz 56.56% 5.36% 12.64% 21.68% 0.08% 3.68%
psteg1, 0.10 bpnz 33.23% 7.21% 9.21% 47.88% 0.08% 2.40%
psteg1, 0.20 bpnz 4.89% 3.85% 1.68% 87.50% 0.00% 2.08%
psteg1, 0.40 bpnz 0.08% 0.80% 0.56% 98.48% 0.00% 0.08%
psteg2, 0.05 bpnz 0.32% 1.28% 2.32% 0.00% 79.36% 16.72%
psteg2, 0.10 bpnz 0.00% 0.16% 0.16% 0.00% 99.20% 0.48%
psteg2, 0.20 bpnz 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.08% 99.84% 0.00%
psteg2, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 0.32% 0.08% 0.00% 99.52% 0.08%
Steghide, 0.05 bpnz 15.13% 6.33% 13.21% 2.80% 2.72% 59.81%
Steghide, 0.10 bpnz 2.40% 6.16% 3.68% 0.96% 3.36% 83.44%
Steghide, 0.20 bpnz 0.00% 2.96% 0.16% 0.16% 3.28% 93.44%
Steghide, 0.40 bpnz 0.00% 0.80% 0.00% 0.08% 1.52% 97.60%
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Figure 4.8 Correct classification rates for the multi-classifier against testing data.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we have proposed two new steganographic algorithms to be used in JPEG
images. We introduced a distortion-minimizing process using a fast, predictable pseudo-random
number generator to create pseudo-random walk through the nonzero AC coefficients that
matches a given payload better than a standard pseudo-random walk. Both algorithms uti-
lize the method of decreasing the absolute value of a nonzero AC coefficient by one to embed
information, except for the case of a ±1 coefficient. The first algorithm, psteg1, changes a co-
efficient of 1 to -1 and -1 to 1, and the second algorithm, psteg2, changes a coefficient of 1 to 2
and -1 to -2. The first-order statistics of a stego image embedded with the psteg1 algorithm are
almost entirely preserved. We compared the second order statistics of the two psteg algorithms
with those of three state-of-the-art steganographic algorithms. The second order statistics were
computed by constructing binary pattern classifiers for each combination of algorithms. We
used a grid search to obtain the best possible parameters for the RBF kernel of each binary
pattern classifier. Furthermore, we constructed a multi-classifier based on a majority vote from
the binary pattern classifiers.
While the probability of detection error is an independent statistic, the results from the
multi-classifier are influenced directly by the other algorithms we chose to compare our algorithm
with. The accuracy of the multi-classifier theoretically should increase with the number of
algorithms used, but there exists a dramatic increase in computational time complexity with
each new algorithm introduced. Using an 8-core Intel Xeon processor with 64GB of ram, we
were able to parallelize feature extraction and SVM training. Even still, it takes roughly 3 hours
to extract the features of 10000 images per algorithm, and 1.5 hours to train each binary SVM.
We found that psteg2 was a highly detectable algorithm. However, psteg1 was as or less
detectable than the other algorithms under most of the statistics we generated. The probability
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of detection error remained constant across all embedding rates due to the fact that the missed
detection rate was negligible. We believe that the reason for these results is that the embedding
method of changing a coefficient of 1 to a -1 distorts the POMM features of the image drastically
from that of a cover image. The design of the psteg algorithm requires that all zero-valued AC
coefficients be removed before the embedding process, so the typical shrinkage model of F5 is not
applicable in this scenario. If a coefficient were changed from a value of 1 to 0, it would break the
algorithm. However, the implementation of Wet Paper Codes into the psteg algorithm would
allow a coefficient of 1 to become 0. The effects that this would have on the detectability of the
algorithm are unknown, but we expect that it would decrease the detectability dramatically.
Further implementation of matrix embedding mixed with the 1/P generator would dramatically
increase the embedding efficiency of the algorithm, but the complexity of combining these two
ideas may be large. All psteg embedding was done using P = 503 as the stego key. Increasing
the size of the prime increases the computational complexity of the algorithm, but it may result
in an improved embedding efficiency. Lastly, the use of other pseudo-random number generators
to find an ideal pseduo-random walk through the nonzero AC coefficients of a JPEG may prove
to increase efficiency.
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